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INTRODUCTION 
Decades of media-government research have shown that media are 
inextricably linked to the interests of the state.2 It has been argued that the 
Western press is sensitive to government pressure and that a convergence 
emerges between press reporting and government policy.3 The relations and 
activities of media and government are especially important since, it has been 
suggested, no wars have been covered without bias and censorship.4 If truth is 
the first casualty of war reporting, then the Afghan conflict has been the best 
example of a fragmented and inconsistent presentation in the Soviet and 
mainstream Western news media. Reiterating certain limited themes, it avoided 
detail, complexity and ambiguity. It was especially subject to political, diplo-
matic, and ideological pressures, superpower rivalry, and the news agencies' 
limitations and preferences. 
On no other foreign policy issue in recent years, has Washington had an 
easier relationship with the media than on the question of Afghanistan. Caught 
between the need for instant analysis and the mind-set of the time, there was no 
adversarial relationship with the government on the basis, context and the 
underlying assumptions of official policy. In line with Washington's unfounded 
optimism, mainstream American reporting on the Afghan conflict raised hopes 
that the Kabul regime would fall soon after the Soviet withdrawal. This is 
perhaps why the Kabul regime's survival since the completion of the Soviet 
force withdrawal has surprised both specialists and the general public. Has the 
media failed in its reporting on a regional conflict ? What have been the major 
trends in Soviet and Western media reporting on Afghanistan? 
This article aims to offer a comparative perspective on the coverage of 
the Afghan conflict in both the Soviet and Western media. The purpose of this 
study is to underline some of the similarities and dissimilarities between them, 
and is divided into three parts: The first part highlights some of the oddities of 
reporting from Afghanistan by offering a broad overview of the nature and scope 
of Western (primarily American), coverage of the Afghan conflict. The second 
part provides an analysis of Soviet coverage of the conflict during the pre-
Gorbachev years, particularly, by elaborating the issues that the Soviet media 
dwelled upon in terms of the regional and international aspects of the Afghan 
conflict. The purpose of this section is to underline the intrinsically interrelated 
nature of official foreign policy pronouncements and the reporting limitations 
placed upon Soviet journalists during this period. Finally, we will bring forth the 
changes under Gorbachev's glasnost (openness) and Novoye politicheskoe 
myshlenie ("New Political Thinking"), in order to provide a perspective on the 
recent changes in Soviet reporting on the Afghan conflict. 
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WESTERN MEDIA REPORTING ON THE AFGHAN CONFLICT 
Without necessarily detailing the intricate theoretical aspects of report-
ing on unconventional warfare, suffice it to say that in Afghanistan, the 
command, control and communications systems were simply absent. This 
lacuna profoundly affected reporting from inside Afghanistan. The means of 
communication with the outside world available to the Afghan resistance 
(popularly known as the Mujahideen) were primitive: travelling scores of miles 
on foot, mules, camels, or motor bikes, Mujahideen news-bearers were under-
standably tempted to add or extract information to suit their personal or 
organizational preferences. In the ten years of the Afghan conflict, only a 
handful of news centers in Peshawar—the Pakistani frontier city that acts as an 
arms transshipment point, intelligence listening post and guerrilla stronghold— 
could develop a reputation for providing news in a sustained and nonpartisan 
manner that enjoyed a degree of international recognition.5 
This shortcoming often resulted in sharp distortions of the actual 
situation inside Afghanistan. The Mujahideen''s war claims were often inflated: 
soon after the Soviet intervention, they began to assert that they controlled over 
90% of the countryside, and that defections and desertions had reduced the 
Afghan Army from over 90,000 to less than 40,000 troops. The Soviet casualty 
figures claimed by the Mujahideen for the first year of the war were more than 
the actual figures for the nine years of conflict. This poor reporting, however, 
was not only due to the guerrillas ' primitive infrastructure. It was also motivated 
by their leaders' desire to keep the morale of their rank-and-file high and to 
please their domestic audience. Equally important was the perceived need to 
impress their regional and international supporters with their better performance 
as compared to, not only the Kabul regime, but also to their rival Mujahideen 
groups. After all, their determined relative strength in tum largely influenced 
their share of the military assistance provided by foreign countries supportive of 
their cause. 
More importantly, however, by the time their news was reported in 
Peshawar, it was often dated and had lost its news-worthiness. From the vantage 
point of Western journalism, such information did not always qualify for print 
in international newspapers. Thus, a stream of Western journalists also reported 
on the Afghan conflict from Kabul, Moscow, Islamabad, Washington and other 
parts of the world. Yet, the Mujahideen sources in Pakistan were an extremely 
important source of coverage. For example, between July 1983 and March 1988 
the Associated Press (AP), one of the largest news agencies in the world, wired 
443 stories from Islamabad, compared with only 19 news stories from Kabul. 
During the same period, it filed 439 stories on Afghanistan from Moscow, and 
1160 from Washington.6 
Unlike the almost daily televised reports of the war in Vietnam and 
Lebanon, there were no live broadcasts from Afghanistan and few dramatic 
headlines in the newspapers. Reporters found that, unlike in Vietnam (where 
helicopters rode newsmen to battle scenes), or in Lebanon (where conflict could 
be filmed from hotel windows), getting close to action in Afghanistan was 
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extremely arduous and dangerous. After 1984, the risk further increased when 
Vitaly Smirnov, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan warned that any journalist 
caught "illegally" inside Afghanistan would be "eliminated." Most of the 
correspondents, therefore, partly or wholly relied on the Mujahideen and dip-
lomatic sources in Peshawar and Islamabad for their information about what was 
happening inside Afghanistan.7 
Because of the length of time it took to cover stories that often lacked 
both authenticity and newness, most editors were unwilling to assign their 
joumalists to Afghanistan. Nor did major news agencies and newspapers set up 
permanent bureaus there. The BBC, for example, had only one man to cover both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, in what was considered a"hardshipposting."8 In many 
respects, therefore, it was a freelancer's war, and this is perhaps the reason why 
reporting on combat in the provinces near the Pakistani border was more 
frequent than that from the interior. Such journalists, called "stingers" in 
journalistic jargon, had the luxury of time and resources to undertake a (usually 
three-day) trip from Peshawar to cover the conflict in the neighboring provinces. 
Dissatisfied with much media reporting, scores of journalists clandes-
tinely travelled inside Afghanistan, particularly after the 1980 expulsion of all 
Western journalists from there and the subsequent Soviet/Afghan refusals to 
grant visas to those who wanted to report from Kabul. This practice cost at least 
eleven journalists their lives,9 and a number ofjournalists captured by the Soviet/ 
Afghan forces were sentenced for espionage and given varying terms of 
imprisonment.10 Those who clandestinely slipped into Afghanistan often jour-
neyed from Pakistan, or in some rare cases, Iran. No journalist is reported to have 
been inside Afghanistan without the assistance of a resistance group, and few 
were reported to have travelled with a resistance group outside the Peshawar-
based coalition of the seven parties, the Islamic Unity of the MgfaaaMujahideen 
(TUAM). The reporting from inside Afghanistan had its own limitations. The 
obvious virtues of reporting on the basis of first-hand knowledge from inside 
Afghanistan notwithstanding, foreign journalists travelling with the Mujahideen 
groups often reported with a kind of romanticization of the Afghan war. Most 
of them had no hesitation in accepting the lexicon used by the resistance and 
calling them the Mujahideen, and their struggle Jihad — terms which were 
loaded with religious connotations and would otherwise be frowned upon in the 
Lebanese or Iranian context. 
Travelling with the combatants often placed inescapable limitations on 
the visiting journalists' freedom of movement. This restriction included the 
journalist's personal dependence on the hosts for, among other things, their own 
personal safety. More importantly however, it entailed the projection of a 
favorable image of the fighting group with which they travelled, particularly in 
comparison to the rival guerrilla groups in the area. It is worth mentioning that 
after adopting such a partisan position, no matter how inadvertently, very few 
journalists later could travel with other Mujahideen groups,11 having already 
alienated them by their prior reporting. Perhaps equally significant, a journalist 
who was critical of his/her hosts was often unable to travel with that same group 
again. In other words, in order to maintain a liaison, or an option to travel again, 
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the visiting journalists were expected to show a degree of partisanship. It was in 
this context that some journalists were even killed by their host parties.12 
For the understandable purposes of personal security from the Afghan-
Soviet forces, and sometimes from Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) or from rival Mujahideen groups, the journalists visiting via 
Pakistan were kept uninformed about their travel plans, a practice that inevitably 
resulted in the journalists' complete dependence on the host groups' plans and 
schedule. Quite often, the travel plans were hastened or delayed, not just for the 
purposes of secrecy and safety but also to demonstrate to the visiting journalist 
the "strength" of the host group. There have been many reports of orchestrated 
ambushes and mock operations by guerrilla groups for their guest journalists' 
cameras. 
A by-product of travelling with the Peshawar-based groups has been the 
reporters' inescapable dependence on the IUAM that has received political and 
military support from Islamabad and Washington. More often, the journalists in 
Peshawar tended to gravitate to the fundamentalist groups which received by far 
the lion's share of American military supplies. In other words, the smaller 
groups that were not represented in the IUAM had little chance of getting 
attention in the international media. The most adversely affected groups in this 
respect have been smaller secularist and nationalist groups on the one hand, and 
some 200 independent military field commanders on the other. Finally, a 
journalist's decision to travel with a particular group was often based not on a 
personal preference, but on considerations for safety and security, past experiences 
of fellow-journalists, and a need to cover specific areas in different regions of 
Afghanistan. Different Mujahideen groups, on the other hand, often perceived 
such decisions as expressions of favor for a particular group. They were, 
therefore, reluctant to entertain the requests of those journalists inside Afghanistan 
who had earlier made such visits with the rival Mujahideen groups. Later re-
alizing the public relational value of such visits, many component parties of 
the IUAM opened offices in Europe and the United States to encourage reporters 
to travel with them. 
Rarely did the visiting journalists come up from their clandestine visits 
inside Afghanistan with what is called a "scoop". Their best achievement was 
to keep international public opinion informed as their reporting provided 
information about the status of military supplies and humanitarian assistance to 
various groups in various parts of the Afghan countryside. On balance, however, 
accounts based on such visits provided little accurate information on the relative 
strength of these groups in those areas. Such information often came from non-
journalistic sources. 
The reporting fromPakistandidnotalwaysoriginate from the Mujahideen 
sources, however. Because of the journalists' difficulties in getting first-hand 
information about the war in Afghanistan, media briefings by Western embas-
sies in Islamabad (and to a lesser extent, New Delhi) became a major channel for 
reporting on the conflict The briefings were based on reports by Western 
diplomatic sources stationed in Kabul. Since the Soviet intervention, all West-
ern countries had recalled their ambassadors from Kabul, reduced their staff and 
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lowered their missions to chargé d'affaires levels. The envoys remaining in 
Kabul were seriously restricted in their own information gathering and acknowl-
edged that there was no way to confirm much of what they passed on. For 
example, the American embassy kept one man on duty by day, counting planes 
flying overhead, and another on duty at night, counting explosions.13 
As in Saigon, the American embassy in Islamabad held weekly back-
ground briefing sessions. Basing information on telegraphic traffic, called 
"sitrep" or the situation reports from Kabul, amiddle-ranking official briefed the 
participants about the military developments inside Afghanistan. Sometime 
called 'Tuesday Follies", the briefings became a weekly news event in them-
selves and were often reported in the Wednesday papers. The official briefer 
listed armed clashes, disturbances in Kabul and other major cities and changes 
in government that came to the attention of the personnel in Kabul. The British 
followed an identical system except that they actually gave out a handout on 
Mujahideen successes. Thus, in a sense, these briefings offered a pool report for 
the news agencies and correspondents who otherwise were barred from cover-
ing the events in person. 
The invited reporters from different news agencies and newspapers used 
the information as they deemed fit. Sometimes, in order to make their reports 
different from one another, they reportedly "engineered" the figures of Soviet/ 
Afghan casualties, material losses, or the Mujahideen's performance. Fre-
quently basing their stories on "informed diplomatic sources", or the "news 
reaching us from Afghanistan", these reporters often had little or no access to the 
Soviet/Afghan diplomats in the region, particularly in the pre-Gorbachev years. 
The journalistic scoops, therefore, rarely originated in Islamabad, Peshawar, 
Kabul or Moscow. These often came from a more distant source: Washington. 
In Washington, media fascination with unveiling Afghan covert opera-
tions was the single most important source of media leaks. To these should be 
added deliberate leaks by conservative adherents of the Reagan Doctrine, who, 
believing that the Reagan Administration's support for the Mujahideen was 
inadequate, wished to embarrass it into doing as much, if not more, than it was 
claiming in its rhetoric.14 Moreover, leaks by members of congressional com-
mittees and autobiographical accounts by the former decisionmakers who wrote 
for their own respective considerations, added more to the exposure in the 
United States of the CIA's Afghan covert operation. 
The themes often reiterated were confined to Soviet expansionism and 
brutalities in Afghanistan, coupled with the Mujahideen's bravery, deep con-
viction for freedom, love for Islam and their tribal values and the corresponding 
hatred for Soviet communism. Sensationalism and romanticization of the 
Mujahideen's valor was sustained by the popular themes of anti-communism in 
the context of East-West rivalry. This is how superficial Western reporting has 
contributed to the absence of more searching questions about the wisdom of U.S. 
policy toward Afghanistan. In all, however, the sources of Western media 
coverage, unlike the Soviet coverage of the Afghan conflict, have been many 
and diverse, even if the quality was uneven and lacking in depth. 
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SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE IN THE BREZHNEV YEARS 
Without ever going into details, Soviet media coverage during the 
Brezhnev years projected the official policy and covered the conflict in broad 
ideological formulations. Thus, there was no credible reporting on other aspects 
of the conflict. Consequently, Soviet media publicists provided neither estimates 
of the number of Sovietforces and their casualties, nor of defections or problems 
which resulted from their stay in a hostile environment. As a matter of fact, 
throughout the Brezhnev years, Soviet media and official pronouncements 
referred to the Afghan conflict as the "problem around Afghanistan", never 
acknowledging that there was in fact a large-scale conflict in Afghanistan, let 
alone the actual participation of Soviet forces. As some Soviet publicists have 
recently conceded, the use of the word "war" was not allowed by the censorship 
authorities. The official control on the media was so firm that when a radio 
commentator used the word "invasion" for the Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan, he was dismissed. 
Since 1979, Soviet media coverage of the conflict has undergone many 
phases. At first the Soviet media virtually ignored the war and acted fundamentally 
as agents of foreign and military policy rather than as agents of domestic 
information.15 Later, Soviet forces were portrayed as performing non-combat, 
humanitarian tasks at the request of the Afghan revolutionaries. It was only from 
mid-1984 that the media admitted that Soviet soldiers were being killed in 
Afghanistan. Before the Autumn of 1986, reports on combat activities focused 
almost exclusively on praising the courage and valor of selfless "international-
ist" soldiers, who were heroically carrying out their military tasks. Details of 
actual combat, whenever reported, were sketchy at best. Further, articles 
continued to appear telling of soldiers sacrificing themselves to save the lives of 
their fellow comrades,16 and the media reports that often glorified Soviet soldiers 
frequently projected a Russian, as opposed to a Soviet, kind of patriotism. In all, 
the Soviet media coverage during die period can be viewed from two distinct 
angles. 
1. On the ideological level, the Soviet media's emphasis focused on the 
reforms undertaken by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 
particularly the agrarian reforms, and the historical value of the Soviet-Afghan 
good neighborly relations. It made no reference to the factional fighting within 
the PDPA, and offered a scanty reference to theMujahideen's military activities, 
claiming that the Saur (April) revolution of 1978 was steadily consolidating. 
Soviet media reports sometimes drew parallels, in order to promote a view of 
Afghanistan as the USSR's strategic frontier, complete with the Basmachi 
guerrillas. These reports stated explicitly that they were looking into the past to 
draw lessons for die future.17 The articles that appeared during the period in-
variably depicted the Soviet army in the historical, Russian terms and the Soviet 
troops as pursuing their duties selflessly.18 Occasional photographs showed them 
planting trees, restoring mosques, and building hospitals, schools, residential 
complexes and roads.19 
2. In the political context, virtually all emphasis was on the regional 
aspect of the conflict, most markedly Pakistani support and the American and 
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Chinese military supplies being provided to the guerrillas. The Soviet media 
sought to minimize the scale of both the Afghan resistance and the Soviet 
military role. In February 1980, for example, Pravda reported Boris Ponomarev 
(then head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party) as claiming that the "Afghan authorities and the Afghan 
population display a friendly attitude towards the Soviet servicemen" and that 
"no clashes are taking place between Afghans and our soldiers, as all kinds of 
'voices' unscrupulously and long-windedly claim."20 Media reports exacer-
bated hatred of the enemy, particularly the Pakistani military, US imperialism 
and the Mujahideen. 
Moscow, as reflected in the Soviet media, had a multifaceted approach 
intended to make Islamabad desist from its policy on Afghanistan on the one 
hand, and to obstruct its emerging special relationship with the United States on 
the other. On one level, the Soviet media warned Islamabad that it was "still not 
too late for Pakistan to stop meddling in Afghanistan's affairs" and that Pakistan 
"should not become a party to Washington's plans because these were fraught 
with many dangers, above all for Pakistan."21 On another level, portraying 
Islamabad as somewhat innocent, the Soviet media critically projected the Sino-
American "common strategy" of "drawing Pakistan into the anti-Afghan plot" 
and, thereby, turning Pakistan into "a sort of powder keg."22 Thus it said that 
Pakistan was "caught in the ugly game."23 The Soviet purpose, it seems, was 
both to discourage Islamabad from becoming a "front-line" state and to dissuade 
the United States and China from aiding Islamabad. 
As early as May-June 1978, the Soviet media had moved to exacerbate 
possible differences between the various actors involved. This policy was 
designed to operate on many levels simultaneously. Soviet media pronounce-
ments repeatedly elevated New Delhi's threat perceptions and highlighted the 
frictions existing between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and the differ-
ences among China, the United States, and Pakistan on the other. The Soviets 
consistently attacked the Pakistan-United States relationship on the grounds that 
it encouraged Islamabad's "aggressive" military capabilities and clandestine 
nuclear program. The Soviet media further charged that the United States was 
acquiring in Pakistan the military bases that would jeopardize Indian security.24 
The Soviet media repeatedly said that the CIA was plotting against India from 
Pakistan and that American military supplies to Pakistan would be used against 
India.25 It was also often added that China was pushing Pakistan into conflict 
with India.26 
In an apparent bid to raise alarm in Washington and New Delhi, the 
Soviet media repeatedly showed concern about Islamabad's nuclear program. 
It periodically played upon Pakistani-Chinese collaboration in the nuclear field 
which was, it said, contrary to US nonproliferation objectives. Soviet publicists 
often urged that the United States should not aid a country that was embarking 
upon a nuclear program which was also a threat to regional security.27 
In yet another demonstration of its policy of exploiting cleavages among 
the various actors involved, the Soviet media played up friction within the 
Afghan rebel groups and between the Afghan and Pakistani population.28 Soviet 
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writings often charged that conditions in the refugee camps were deplorable, and 
that the refugees wanted to return to Afghanistan but the Mujahideen and Pa-
kistani officials were not allowing them to leave. Yet, thousands of refugees 
were said to be returning to Afghanistan. Soviet media pronouncements charged 
that resistance groups were running prison cells in the refugee camps.29 Ironi-
cally, it also charged Islamabad with preferential treatment of the Afghan 
refugees compared to the Biharis and Muhajirs, the refugees who had come to 
Pakistan earlier from Bangladesh and India respectively.30 
Soviet publicists often highlighted the factional fighting within the 
Mujahideen groups, implicating them, together with Pakistani civilian and 
military officials, in selling weapons, diverting aid meant for refugees, smug-
gling, and drug trafficking. Moscow routinely discredited them for fighting with 
one another over the distribution of Western and Chinese supplies, for the bomb 
blasts in various parts of Pakistan, and for collaboration with the CIA.31 The Soviet 
media constantly stressed the frictions existing between the Afghans and 
Pakistan's local population, particularly between the Afghan rebels and the 
leaders of tribal areas on the one hand, and the leaders of tribal areas and the 
Pakistani government on the other.32 Meanwhile, it showed a particular interest 
in projecting the views held by the Pakistani opposition parties on the Afghan 
crisis. As these views were mostly opposed to Islamabad's policy, Moscow's 
purpose was to highlight the unpopular nature of Islamabad's policy in Afghani-
stan.33 
In the Soviet Central Asian press, however, more effort than in the 
central Soviet press was directed at discrediting the Afghan Mujahideen. There 
were more specific references to their atrocities, crimes and backwardness. 
There was also a visible concerted effort to prove that the support for the rebels 
was narrow and constantly shrinking. Numerous reports in the regional press 
highlighted the Mujahideeri% ruthlessness, which included crop-burning, cut-
ting trees down, laying mines disguised as toys, destroying schools, hospitals 
and mosques, and attacking the civilian population. The latter activity included 
the assault, torturing and killing of women and children, as well as burning 
people alive.34 
Until 1983-84, the Soviet press played down any mention of Soviet 
military activity in Afghanistan. The low volume of reporting prompted a Soviet 
soldier in Afghanistan to write "To be honest, I am surprised at how little is 
written about Afghanistan and about the Soviet people who are honorably doing 
their duty, often risking their life."35 After 1983-84, however, when the Soviet 
press began to occasionally report the existence of Soviet casualties, reports by 
journalists attached to the Soviet troops exalted their material values, camara-
derie and the excitement of military life. Soviet soldiers were glorified and 
depicted as heroes and saviors, particularly after 1985 when medals were 
lavished on Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan. 
Only under Yuri Andropov, when there was believed to be some 
moment toward a political settlement, did the Soviet media briefly give some 
coverage to the problems and difficulties faced by Soviet troops in combat 
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operations.36 Upon Andropov's hospitalization, however, this trend was re-
versed again. 
Overall, reporting on Afghanistan was anecdotal and the primary focus 
of Soviet media coverage continued to be on its regional and international 
dimension. The Soviet media did not report in any detail on the political and 
military situation in the country, the factional fighting within the ruling PDPA 
or, for that matter, even the existence of widespread conflict in the country. 
CHANGES IN MEDIA COVERAGE UNDER GORBACHEV 
The Soviet media's coverage of foreign affairs, particularly that of the 
Afghan war, expanded within the scope of glasnost. Given the communist 
party's continued 'leading role' in Soviet society and given the fact that until 
very recently Gorbachev's own pronouncements have not been open to direct 
public challenge, it is important to emphasize that the Soviet media did not 
provide the lead for the new leadership to change its policy on Afghanistan. On 
the contrary, Gorbachev's policies outlined how the Soviet media could cover 
the Afghan war, generally, within the vaguely defined boundaries of glasnost. 
Consequently, the coverage of the Afghan war evolved out of heroic anecdotes 
of selfless internationalism to self-criticism and cynicism.37 It was only during 
1986 and afterwards that the major characteristics of the new political thinking 
in Soviet policy on Afghanistan began to appear as a debate in Soviet literature 
as the "New Political Thinking" began. 
The campaign for openness on domestic issues in the Soviet press began 
gradually to unfold in 1985. The trend towards greater candidness in the Soviet 
media's handling of sensitive topics became increasingly marked after the 27th 
Party Conference. Such topics as drug abuse, excessive censorship, and the 
moral crisis in Soviet society were accorded frank and serious treatment in the 
mass media. The central press from Moscow provided the lead in glasnost, and 
sometimes even criticized the local press in the Republics for being slow in 
adapting to the new policies. Pravda, for example, complained: "Sometimes it 
is hard to notice any change in the local press."38 It was acknowledged in sections 
of the media that the reports in Pravda and Izvestya were more open and in-
formative, but the local press in the Republics remained unresponsive to the idea 
of glasnost.39 
Many topics remained taboo, however, and especially little change was 
evident in Soviet reporting on international affairs. Glasnost regarding inter-
national issues began to emerge gradually as a result of the aftermath of the 
accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant. However, changes in coverage of 
foreign affairs was really the result of debates on "blank spots" in Soviet history, 
such as Stalin's atrocities, the Second World War, and the nationalities problem, 
a debate which predated the Chernobyl incident, but which was accentuated by 
it. 
In January 1986, Izvestya commentator Aleksandr Bovin called for 
changes in Soviet media reporting on events in foreign countries.'10 A year later, 
Fedor Burlatsky complained that the shifts in Soviet foreign policy had failed 
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significantly to improve Soviet media coverage of foreign affairs: "The coun-
try's leaders have stated the necessity of humanizing international relations, of 
renouncing primitive stereotypes, and of abandoning the concept of the enemy. 
At times, however, journalists reporting on foreign affairs stir up the same old 
waters and set the course of confrontation."41 
Izvestya opened a new column entitled "Echo," wherein it published the 
results of opinion polls conducted among readers on various "burning" issues. 
In line with the campaign for openness, the Soviet press started to pay more 
attention to public opinion polls and the newspapers began to publish readers' 
letters expressing a wider selection of views. In February 1987 Pravda intro-
duced a regular column that published commentaries and speeches by Western 
political figures. It published several letters from readers who called on the 
newspaper to give more coverage of foreign affairs and to drop "slogan-
mongering" in its coverage of the West.42 During 1987, a number of commen-
tators discussed the need for glasnost with regard to foreign policy issues, and 
articles continued to appear, discussing ways in which the coverage of foreign 
affairs might be improved;43 some authors also accused the "official propa-
ganda" of trying to resolve intemational problems by "blackening the West" and 
encouraging "a Cold War mentality".44 
Soviet television took up glasnost later than the print media, but en-
dorsed the policy more resoundingly than the press had. In 1987, Soviet 
television telecast uncensored interviews with many Western leaders, increased 
the quantity of live air time, aired many new programs that combined entertain-
ment with current affairs and began a frequent practice of satellite hook-ups with 
their counterpart television stations in Europe, Australia and the United States. 
It was against this background that Gorbachev made a series of 
proposals concerning overall foreign policy formation. At the 19th Conference 
of the CPSU, he made the following points: foreign policy issues should be the 
subject of constant scientific and public discussion; the quality of information 
on international issues should be substantially improved; in reforming its 
political system, the USSR must create a mechanism with full constitutional 
powers for the discussion of international political issues; commissions of the 
central committee should be established to address foreign policy issues; and 
glasnost means pluralism of opinion on any question of domestic and foreign 
policy.45 Soon after, Foreign Minister Sheverdnadze added that when key issues 
of foreign and domestic policy are under discussion, "the appearance of 
different, perhaps diametrically opposite, views is a natural phenomenon."46 
Izvestya's political commentator Aleksandr Bovin has been in the 
forefront of the movement to extend glasnost to foreign policy. Contending in 
an interview that "Foreign policy was affected by the ulcers of Stalinism," Bovin 
gave examples of the difficulties facing Soviet journalists who wanted to write 
about foreign affairs: "what is one to do? Journalists are denied the opportunity 
tocarryoutobjective [reports].... Our political and moral duty is to tell the people 
the truth about Afghanistan. The Soviet people did not accept this war, and the 
country's political leadership did the only thing it could do."47 The new style of 
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reporting on Afghanistan, however, was pioneered by Artyem Borovik (the son 
of a well-known political commentator and Chairman of the Soviet peace 
committee, Genrikh Borovik). 
Ogonyok, Moscow News, and Sobesednik, the weekly supplement to 
Komsomolskaya pravda, led the way by acknowledging that there was a 
considerable antipathy among youth towards what was happening in Afghanistan. 
Reflecting the beginning of a new candor in the Soviet press insofar as 
discussing popular attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan were concerned, a 
Ukrainian youth newspaper published an outspoken protest from the mother of 
two draftees in which she objected to the way the media dealt with the war in 
Afghanistan.48 She complained that it was only the sons of ordinary workers who 
were sent into battle. A public opinion poll carried out by the Sociological 
Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the French polling 
organization IPSOS revealed that 53% of the 1,000 Muscovites who took part 
favored the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.49 Glasnost on 
Afghanistan became even more pronounced in the Soviet media as the efforts 
aimed at political settlement entered their final phase. The size of the Soviet 
"contingent" in Afghanistan was made public, and their casualties were disclosed. 
According to General Lizichev more than 35,000 suffered some permanent 
disability.50 Money was collected for the construction of a hospital in Alma-Ata 
for them.51 Their performance and difficulties were discussed with an unprec-
edented frankness. Many private associations of Afghan veterans were encouraged 
to emerge, some even to share their experiences with their American counter-
parts from the Vietnam War. Some 8,000 "Blue Beret" paratroop veterans were 
allowed to congregate from all over the country for a reunion. The cornerstone 
for an Afghan war veterans' monument was laid and the Soviet government 
made some effort to meet the veterans' demands for recognition. Literaturnaya 
gazeta, started an unusual crusade to honor the POWs and to reexamine the cases 
of soldiers charged with collaborating while captive. 
Although Soviet reporting from Afghanistan began to give a more 
realistic picture of the combat and the strength of the Mujahideen, the unin-
formative style of the past continued in most press reports, causing some Soviet 
readers to register their protest. In June 1987,intheMoscow7Ve>vs,aSoviet officer 
gave readers hard figures on the scale of opposition in Afghanistan: "At present 
the armed gangs number over 100,000 [and are] subdivided into 3,000 groups 
and units ."52 The same month a report stated that the Mujahideen had staged over 
2,000 attacks since January, while in July a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman 
admitted that Soviet/Afghan forces were suffering from the effects of improved 
Mujahideen anti-aircraft capability.53 Many reports portrayed the heroism of 
gunship and aircraft pilots.54 An Afghan official was reported as having said that 
the resistance attacks on the Soviet-Afghan garrisons had increased four- to five-
fold since the cease-fire was declared.55 
More importantly however, depictions of the horrors of the war as seen 
by the soldiers also began to surface.56 While the authors of this spate of reports 
looked more frankly at the war, they by no means opposed it. Many articles in 
the Soviet armed forces daily continued to balance the grim realities of the war 
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with optimism. Increasingly, articles appeared that carried letters to the editor 
criticizing the melodramatic and uninformative media coverage of the war.58 
Pravda admitted that past coverage had dealt only with such things as Soviet 
soldiers planting friendship trees and Soviet doctors delivering the children of 
Afghan women. Citing a letter from an angry father whose son had died in 
Afghanistan, it wrote: "Our mass media... reflects events occurring in Afghanistan 
very superficially, in a fragmented way, and even at times unrealistically...."59 
Pravda discussed readers' letters about earlier articles on Afghanistan and the 
plight of the returning veterans. These letters suggested that popular discontent 
with the war was growing, in part because the sons of the party elite reportedly 
managed to get out of serving in Afghanistan.60 
A Literaturnaya gazeta report asserted that the sons and grandsons of 
"writers, cultural figures, and high ranking administrators" were under-repre-
sented among the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.61 In a letter quoted in Pravda, 
a Moscow worker asserted that "the war in Afghanistan would have ended long 
ago if, along with the sons of workers, collective farmers, and the intelligentsia, 
the children of the leaders were sent there as well."62 This was perhaps the first 
time that the central press had broached the issue directly.63 Further, many 
stories appeared exposing the shabby treatment accorded returning Afghansky 
(Afghan veterans), by local bureaucrats and ordinary citizens.64 Such themes as 
the poor treatment of veterans had appeared earlier in 1984 during the time of 
Konstantin Chernenko.65 
Many reports indicated that the Afghan war had became unpopular 
among the Soviet rank-and-file deployed in Afghanistan. According to Vladimir 
Nadein, the letters editor of Izvestya, at first the letters about Afghanistan were 
guarded, hinting in 1986 and 1987 at doubts, anger, frustration. But since then 
they have grown in volume and boldness.66 According to Borovik, only five % 
of the letters received by the magazine Ogonyok—mainly from the veterans of 
the Second World War—demanded that the war be continued to a "victorious 
end"; the overwhelming majority had demanded an immediate end to the war 
and Soviet involvement.67 
Concurrently, this self-criticism was accompanied by a critical look at 
the PDPA, its program, leadership and government in Kabul. In an editorial, 
Pravda conceded that "far from all people in Afghanistan," even "the working 
sections of the population," had not accepted the April Revolution.68 Nodari 
Simoniya, one of the most influential scholars on third world revolutions 
referred to the PDPA reforms as "absolutely foolish" and "really adventurist."69 
Simonia also reversed the previously granted revolutionary status of the PDPA 
and added that it had a "very narrow base" and that it "was a revolutionary 
democratic party which needed consolidation and required the presence of a 
Communist Party...but the country was not ready for such radical reforms."70 
In July 1987, a Soviet daily gave its readers a glimpse of how vulnerable 
even Kabul was to thcMujahideen.11 Ogonyok provided a trooper's eye-view of 
Najibullah's policy of national reconciliation, which Gorbachev praised in his 
February 1988 offer to withdraw from Afghanistan. A Soviet soldier sarcasti-
cally remarked to Artyem Borovik, "If I did not read [Soviet] papers, I would 
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never know that we are in full flush of 'reconciliation.'"72 Borovik himself 
commented in an article, "From what I read in the Soviet press, I expected to see 
the basis of a socialist economy in Afghanistan. I discovered that socialism had 
not taken roots there."73 
In the most pessimistic assessment published in the USSR, Major 
General Kim M. Tsagolov, a military advisor in Afghanistan from 1981 to 1984 
and again in 1987, and a specialist from the Frunze Military Academy, described 
in Ogonyok that the PDPA, preoccupied with factional fighting, had lost by 
antagonizing believers, and mismanaging the land reforms. He acknowledged 
that the events that brought the PDPA to power were, in fact, "a military coup" 
which had "the potential to turn into a national democratic revolution.... 
Unfortunately, that did not happen." Saying that "a significant part of the people 
moved away from the party and stopped believing in it as a leading force that is 
capable of carrying out its reform plans," General Tsagolov criticized the Najib 
government for trying to negotiate a coalition government with guerrilla leaders 
based in Pakistan, a tactic which, he said, was unrealistic; instead it should 
concentrate on coopting the regional guerrilla leaders.74 Although some analysts 
had previously criticized die decision to send forces into Afghanistan, it was the 
first time that the PDPA was directly criticized and that the prospects were so 
grimly portrayed. 
Concurrently, the media coverage of many Afghan field commanders 
became extremely positive and Artyem Borovik, even described Ahmed Shah 
Massud, afieldcommanderin the northern provinces, as "bright and diplomatic."75 
Such efforts were coupled with changes in the Soviet lexicon: instead of 
referring to the resistance as bandits and mercenaries, they were now referred to 
as the "misguided" Afghans. Gorbachev himself, in his speech at Vladivostock, 
labelled them as "patriots living on the other side of the border." Artyem Borovik 
later highlighted the irony: "Now, even in our press, we do not call the 
Mujahideen enemies. Simply, 'the armed opposition'. What kind of war is it 
where there is no enemy ?"76 
This opened a Pandora's box on the intervention itself, and on the nature 
of decision-making during Brezhnev's period. Vyacheslav Dashichev of the 
Institute for Socialist World Economics asserted that the Soviet national interest 
did not lie in "chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with 
leadership coups in developing countries." The elitist nature of foreign policy 
decision-making, the distorted picture of the outside world and the Soviet 
Union's isolation from the international community doomed it to stagnation.77 
Commenting on the decisionmaking process during the Brezhnev years, Yevgeni 
Primakov, director of the Soviet Institute of the World Economy and Interna-
tional Relations, stated that Soviet foreign policy generally was formulated with 
only one or two options open to the leadership, and alternative policies were 
never examined.78 Genrikh Borovik, a journalist and head of the Soviet Peace 
Committee, said mat further error in the way Soviet foreign policy was 
formulated was due to the virtual exclusion of most citizens, even Communist 
Party members, from the process: "We often ignored public opinion, or failed 
to take it into consideration, and we acted on the assumption that we had a 
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monopoly on the truth."79 That the Brezhnev team used activism in the Third 
World in order to divert attention from domestic problems, was conceded by 
Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist 
System: the government had erred for many years in believing that there were 
foreign policy solutions to problems, particularly economic development, that 
actually required domestic policy changes.80 Aleksandr Bovin stated bluntly 
that the introduction of troops into Afghanistan reflected an excessive tendency 
to use military force in Soviet foreign policy.81 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, who for years had devoted his efforts to justifying 
the invasion of Afghanistan, acknowledged of the failure ofthat policy: "When 
we sent in the troops, we assumed... (that) the internal civil strife would 
eventually die down.... It did not happen." Prokhanov noted the impact of the 
war at home: 
"In society the questions grow. They cannot be avoided. They 
are asked in families and in private conversations, they are 
beginning to be heard at public meetings, tomorrow they will 
burst forth in the press, breaking the many years' silence... Only 
God and the top politicians knew how they agonized over the 
decision.... An incorrect prediction was made,... experts were 
wrong in their assessments of the situation in the country, 
mistakes were made by specialists in Islam, diplomats, politi-
cians, the military."82 
In response, Academician Bogomolov, one of Gorbachev's economic 
advisors, said that his Institute was opposed to the intervention.83 This was the 
first time that the Soviet press had published material showing that the decision 
to send forces into Afghanistan was contested within the foreign policy estab-
lishment. 
Thus, Soviet commentators and officials began to speak with increasing 
frankness about the blunders that led them into the Afghan conflict. Vladimir 
Snegirev, a journalist who spent a year in Afghanistan, noted a certain "enigma" 
about the way Soviet forces went there.84 Many Soviet observers asserted that 
in 1979 the leadership did not anticipate a major, long-term crisis. Aleksandr 
Bovin, for example, asserted that "the whole structure of the Afghan operation 
—its supply lines, the infrastructure—presupposed a short operation of a year, 
perhaps even less."85 Aleksandr Prokhanov, likewise, said that the widespread 
assumption was that casualties in Afghanistan would not exceed those of a major 
military exercise. According to Prokhanov, by 1984 the casualties had become 
a problem. The losses generated internal political pressure, with letters to the 
leadership, editors, and complaints from intellectuals. This peaked at the end of 
1986, according to Prokhanov, and Afghanistan thus became an "extremely 
acute internal problem."86 Snegirev contended that the "introduction of Soviet 
troops there did more harm than good - to our country, Afghanistan, the Afghan 
revolution, and the world in general." The intervention was a "detonator" that 
seriously complicated the situation, and provided the Mujahideen with a 
"wonderful trump card." Soviet advisors did not understand the situation on the 
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ground and "There was a very large amount of stupid advice."87 As part of such 
frank discussions and admissions, Gennadi Gerasimov, head of Information for 
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "We will think twice, thrice, before 
we move in again... An intervention like this is not going to happen. I cannot 
foresee it."88 
Evidence of disenchantment on the home front was complemented by 
frank reporting on the war itself. Although Borovik explicitly rejected attempts 
to draw parallels between Afghanistan and Vietnam, his articles have drawn 
from Dispatches (1977) by the American journalist Michael Herr. Citing Hen-
he even wrote, "I went to cover the war, and the war covered me."89 Saying that 
a soldier in Afghanistan sees more in three months than a civilian might see in 
seventy years, Borovik further predicted that "something called 'Afghanistan 
syndrome'" would emerge and that "it would be more serious than the war 
itself'.90 
CONCLUSIONS 
This discussion has underlined some similarities and dissimilarities 
between Western and Soviet media coverage of the Afghan conflict. Ironically, 
Soviet and Western media coverage have been, in some respects, mirror images 
of each other. Just as the Western media did not entertain any claims of 
consolidation by the Kabul regime, Soviet media publicists routinely dismissed 
everything that the Mujahideen claimed. The Western media perceived the 
Karmal regime as Moscow's puppet brought to power on Russian tanks. 
Moscow characterized the Zia regime as serving American interests in South-
west Asia and kept in power by generous American aid. Islamabad and 
Washington refused to negotiate with Kabul about the future political settlement 
of the crisis. Likewise, Moscow refused to speak with Islamabad, saying that the 
crisis was a problem "around Afghanistan" to be resolved directly with Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. Moscow also perceived the Zia government in Pakistan as 
transitory, hoping that it would come to an end soon. Likewise in the West, the 
Kabul regime from its inception was thought to be an aberration that would 
crumble once the Soviet troops were withdrawn. 
In many respects, however, any comparison is unfair because the 
purpose, philosophy and the mechanisms of journalism in these two societies 
during the 1980s were aimed at fundamentally different objectives, and they 
performed profoundly different roles. The practice of competition between 
various western newsagencies and newspapers, as well as motives of profit that 
promised extensive coverage and shades of opinion on Afghanistan, was absent 
in the Soviet case. Soviet journalists, fundamentally subordinate to the official 
line, for the most part tried to keep the war secret from the Soviet public; 
whereas, the Western journalists sometimes even risked their lives to report the 
combat from a landlocked distant land. Having said this, mainstream Western 
media coverage - unlike that on other regional conflicts like Nicaragua and 
Angola - has been by and large in line with Administration perceptions and 
policy postures. It should be emphasized that the failures of Western reportage 
allowed a situation to develop where until recently there was little critique of 
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or pressure against some of the rationales advanced for an American policy that 
has led to a diplomatic, political and military impasse. 
Even if western coverage of the Afghan conflict was far greater than the 
state controlled Soviet media's, it did not necessarily always entail quality and 
maturity. Objectivity in Western media reporting on Afghanistan has rarely 
been attainable. For the most part, therefore, dogmatism and dullness were not 
exclusive to the Soviet media. 
Unlike a total war, where a nation's territorial integrity and national 
security are threatened and which demands total patriotism from the media, 
limited wars in distant lands demand limited patriotism and the limited sacrifice 
of truth, as has been the case in all regional conflicts in which the United States 
was involved since the Second World War. The more the wars are limited the 
greater is the degree of dissent. Afghanistan perhaps is the lone exception in 
which the mainstream Western media showed little, if any, dissension to 
Washington's handling of the largest covert operation since the Vietnam War. 
Even now, when the Mujahideen have not been able to over-run Kabul and 
Washington's earlier optimism is fast eroding, the media has been critical of the 
"handling" of the war, but not of the Administration's policy itself. 
Under Gorbachev, the Soviet media coverage has moved from a spirit of 
self-congratulation, to utter frustration and cynicism to national soul-searching. 
Despite profound changes in Soviet media coverage under Gorbachev's rubric 
of glasnost, it would be inaccurate to conclude that media in Soviet Union was 
instrumental in bringing the "undeclared war" in Afghanistan to Soviet living 
rooms, as did the coverage of the Vietnam war to the American people. 
Nevertheless, under Gorbachev the Soviet media did use the Afghan war as a 
vehicle for political change by raising questions about how they entered the war, 
who was responsible, and what its lessons were — questions on which hinged 
the success of the unfolding programs ofglasnost andperestroika. In all, it would 
appear that in recent years, the Soviet media has aspired to both disseminate 
information and manipulate public opinion. Thus, even if the Soviet media did 
not provide a lead for the policy changes on Afghanistan, it did, nevertheless, 
facilitate somewhat Gorbachev's decision to disengage and withdraw from 
Afghanistan. 
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